

Comparative Studies on East Asia

東アジア比較研究

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What is “Comparative Research?”

—Thoughts on the Completion of the 3-Year Project—

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The “Comparative Studies on Economic and Social Development and Modernization in East Asia” (or “Comparative Studies on East Asia” for short) Project was a truly large-scale international, interdisciplinary academic effort. Sponsored by the Ministry of Education as one of its “Scientific Research on Priority Areas” programs, the research was carried out between fiscal 1987 and 1989 and correlated in 1990. Altogether, it brought together 110 experts from numerous disciplines, including political science, economics, history, sociology, philosophy, the history of thought, and area studies.

Because it was the first of the Ministry of Education’s priority areas to be drawn from the realm of the humanities and social sciences, the project attracted a great deal of attention from many sectors. To be sure, we encountered difficulties and sometimes had to proceed by a process of trial and error, but fortunately our efforts were very fruitful in terms of new knowledge gained. Furthermore, the three general assemblies were participated in by several of the most prominent foreign scholars in their respective fields and I believe that nearly all the points that needed to be discussed were considered in depth.

I attribute the successful completion of the project to the earnest cooperation of the heads of each study group and the group participants, as well as the unflagging support of the members of the Science Council and involved officials from the Ministry of Education. I wish to extend my deepest appreciation to all concerned.

Our research evoked a variety of responses in Japan and abroad, and the various results of the three years of joint research have been published in many different fashions. In this essay I would like to offer some thoughts on why we chose to call our research “comparative studies.”

It is true that we often hear the expression “comparative studies” these days, but too often this title is used in cases where no theoretical concepts have been agreed upon. Especially in the realm of the social sciences, in recent years comparative politics has enjoyed great popularity, even though there too we can note many cases where books offer no clear theoretical assumptions.

Linguistics is the field in which comparative research and comparative studies has been systematically pursued longest. No doubt that is because comparisons among various languages is ipso facto an indispensable part of linguistics.

In this 1950 book *Hikaku Gengogaku (Comparative Linguistics; Iwanami Zensho)*, Harushige Takatsu divides this field of study into three stages: I. general comparison without reference to cultural, geographic or other prerequisites; II. comparison of languages with historical ties; and, III. comparison of similarities and differences of languages in the same group and investigation of their links as far as historical origins are concerned. In the book he also argues “Discoveries made with the comparative approach have allowed us to extend our vision back to the ages before written records.”

Also, it was due more than anything else to the success of comparative research that the scope of linguistics broadened. With the course of time, the comparative approach was also extended to the field of art. Indeed, Dagobert Frey of the Vienna School of art historians writes the following at the beginning of his study *Comparative Art*: “All manner of observation is based on comparison.” (Translated into Japanese under the title *Hikaku Geijusugaku* by Kenjiro Yoshioka; Sobunsha, 1961).

He also declares that a given category is perforce clearly established as a basic art motif precisely through comparison of its uniformity (familiarity, mutual relationship, or joint membership in a more comprehensive cultural sphere) and differences (distinctiveness, mutual tension, originality) with other fields of art.

This kind of comparative research or study also has made its mark in the field of history as "comparative history." Marc Bloch, a leading historian of the analytical school, who vehemently criticizes dull reliance on the positivist historical approach, called in his work *Comparative History Methodology* (Translated into Japanese under the title *Hikakushi no Hoho* by Kiyonori Takahashi; Sobunsha, 1978) for comparisons to be made by historians. He suggests that two or more specific phenomena be chosen from two different social situations and that explanations for the similarities and differences discovered among them be sought. He also stresses the vital link between comparative history and area research, writing: "If there were no historical area studies, then comparative history could accomplish nothing.....conversely, if there were no comparative history, historical area studies would doubtlessly be totally unproductive."

One book that is important in this regard is *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.; 1964) by the eminent American political historian Louis Hartz. Through comparative area research Hartz was able to increase our overall historical understanding of the distinctive, social cross-sections of these new societies.

Here we can discover a major point shared with our "Comparative Studies on East Asia" project. It also serves to reemphasize for us the importance of the existence of comparative area studies in the various social sciences. (In this regard see *Area Studies at Present* edited by Mineo Nakajima and Chalmers Johnson. The Japanese title is *Chiiki Kenkyu no Genzai*; Taishukan Shoten, 1989).

Among the valuable comparative studies on the East Asian region that have been made in recent years, we should mention Chie Nakane's 1987 work *Shakai Jinrui-gaku—Aja Shoshakai no Kosatsu (Social Anthropology—Studies of Various Societies in Asia*; Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai), which approaches the subject from the viewpoint of social anthropology. In it Dr. Nakane draws on his experience from many years of field work to compare analytically the social structures in different Asian societies. He brilliantly elucidates the differences in the ruling social strata in traditional China, Korea and Japan (Confucian gentry, yangban, samurai), and by comparing the structure of groups in Japan with those in India and China, sheds new light on the distinctive features of group structures in China and South Korea.

As this suggests, if comparative study of institutions is taken as the X axis and comparative study of cultures in the different societies of East Asia is taken as the Y axis, then for first time we can achieve comprehensive comparative research as far as areas studies is concerned.

Next, let us turn to comparative studies in the field of political science. As we have already seen, comparative politics has already become accepted as an important sub-field of political science. And G.A. Almond, who has sought to provide a theoretical basis for systemization of comparative political studies, chose the framework of comparative government for his research and has been developing heuristic concepts for his analysis of the situation in non-Western regions (Asia, the Mideast, Africa, Latin America). See (Gabriel A. Almond, *Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory* <Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970>).

However, we should be aware that in political science such research has amounted to more than simply the "comparative study of politics," but rather the establishment of "comparative politics" in its own right. And we can also conclude that thanks to comparative studies, political science itself has become a more reliable social science.

As Hideo Uchiyama has put it: "The act of comparing demands that he who is comparing clearly identify his goals. Consequently, when a researcher compares, he must as an absolute prerequisite possess the ability to accurately understand and appraise history." (*Hikaku Seijiko <Comparative Political Thinking>*, edited by Hideo Uchiyama, Mitsumine Shobo, 1990).

It is certainly true, as shown from the case of area studies, that more than anything else comparative research affords an opportunity to actually prove whether or not theories and hypotheses are based on a true understanding and evaluation of history. In this regard, during China's Cultural Revolution many China experts grievously violated this rule in their analyses of Mao Zedong's China and were almost totally lacking in this detached perspective provided by comparative studies. We can even say that they got totally carried away by their emotional, sentimental or ideological sympathy for what they thought was happening.

The great critic of civilization and historical sociologist Raymond Aron warned about the need to apply the techniques of comparative studies to the Communist world. Early on he argued that it was precisely comparative studies that was "historical sociology's most excellent technique." He added that "By using the technique of historical comparison, we can test the correctness of theories advanced to explain phenomena, and should so test them." (Raymond Aron, "Conflict and War from the Viewpoint of Historical Sociology," in Stanley Hoffmann (ed.), *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960).

However, it should be noted that at first within the realm of the social sciences, most disciplines that used the techniques of comparative studies did so in a less conceptualized fashion than did comparative politics, naturally leading to various trial and error experiments.

And despite the fact that the term "comparative politics" had already become commonplace, there was a time when the expressions "comparative economics" and "comparative sociology" were seldom heard. The reasons might be traced to the feeling of experts in the fields of economics and sociology that they were as a matter of course pursuing such comparative research.

As for the field with which we have been immediately concerned, namely the concept of modernization, there were pioneering studies, such as W.W. Rostow's comparative research on the process of modernization that resulted in his theory of "stages of growth" as laid out in his book *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960). (Translated as *Keizai Seicho no Shodankai* by Takeyasu Kimura, Masako Kubo and Yasusuke Murakami; Daiyamondosha, 1961). Another example is Cyril E. Black's theory of modernization drawn from his typological comparative studies as reported in his book *Comparative Modernization Theory* (translated as *Hikaku Kindaika Ron*, Kiyoko Takeda <ed.>, Miraisha, 1970).

Gabriel A. Almond, who I mentioned earlier, also coedited a book with James S. Coleman entitled *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton University Press, 1960; translated into Japanese as *Hatten Tojo Chiiki no Seiji*). This is actually a structural analysis of the prevailing situation as seen from the angle of comparative studies.

On the other hand, the famous scholar Samuel P. Huntington uses comparative studies to look at things from the perspective of analysis of dynamic change in his *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Translated into Japanese by Hideo Uchiyama as *Henkakuki Shakai no Seiji Chitsujo*, Simul Shuppankai, 1972). Also worth consulting in this regard are Yuzo Yabuno's *Hikaku Seijigaku no Apurochi (Approaches to Comparative politics)* in Ichiro Sunada and Yu Yabuno's *Hikaku Seijigaku no Riron (Comparative Political Theory)* <Tokai Daigaku Shuppankai, 1990>.

All of these works show that proper weight must be given by area studies to theory and its application, but at the same time when such area studies are undertaken as comparative studies this allows for a synthesis combining static analysis with dynamic analysis.

Thus an opportunity has been created for area specialists to escape the pitfalls described as follows by Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy in their work *Comparative Political Sociology—Problems and Perspectives* (Translated into Japanese by Yoji Sakurai as *Hikaku Seiji Shakaigaku*, Ashi Shobo, 1983): "It is very easy for area

specialists who limit their interest to one particular area to fall into traps because of the very nature of their approach."

Furthermore, the French political sociologist Dogan, in addressing the starting point for comparative research in this work notes: "The act of comparing is by nature an inherent function of the human mind." He adds, "Comparative research should be undertaken not only to better grasp the special characteristics of your own environment. Comparative studies should also serve to extend the field of your observations so that you may discover the underlying laws of social phenomena and be able to ferret out the general causes underlying apparently random events."

He further argues: "It is a technique for transforming the social sciences into true 'sciences.'" These comments from the book show just how highly Dogan evaluates comparative studies.

In addition to recommending the standard use of case studies based on the comparative studies approach so as to allow for dealing with problems from a comprehensive vantage point, in his book Dogan also offers three specific methods for doing just that. They are: I. depending on the subject of study, comparisons should be made between two carefully selected countries (dualistic comparison); II. comparisons should be conducted among several similar countries; and, III. comparisons should be made among several dissimilar countries.

We might conclude that in this manner comparative area studies have followed the original example of linguistics in establishing a high profile for the comparative studies approach.


Our "Comparative Studies on East Asia" project allows for frameworks for analysis of either the similarities or dissimilarities among various countries and areas in the region. This also makes possible the gradual advance from dualistic comparative studies of two nations or regions to multinational or multiregional comparative studies and eventually to comparisons of the "Confucian Cultural Zone" in East Asia with other quite different major cultural zones.

If that should lead to general conceptualizations or models mutually applicable to all the cultural zones studies then the "Comparative Studies on East Asia" project can be judged to have been successful in helping us to better understand the international environment surrounding us and in affording us a priceless vantage point for observing developments in the new age of internationalization that is dawning as we approach the 21st Century.

Lastly, I should like to extend my profoundest thanks to all those who lent me support during the three years of the research project and one year of correlation and summing up that I have served as the Chief Coordinator of the Project.

(December 20, 1990)

Organization of the Studies



List of Participants in Studies

Main Items of Studies		Head of Study Group	Participants						
A	Comparative Area Studies on East Asia I: China · Hong-Kong · Taiwan	Mineo Nakajima (Prof. / Tokyo Univ. of Foreign Studies/Faculty of Foreign Studies)	Noriyuki Tokuda (Prof. / Univ. of Tsukuba/College of Social Science)	Tomoyuki Kojima (Prof. / Kyoto Sangyō Univ./Faculty of Foreign Language)	Katsuji Nakagane (Prof. / Hitotsubashi Univ./Faculty of Economics)	Hidenori Ijiri (Assistant Prof. /Kobe City Univ. of Foreign Studies/Faculty of Foreign Studies)	Ryōsei Kokubun (Assistant Prof./ Keio Univ./ Faculty of Law)	Ryōen Minamoto (Prof./ International Christian Univ./Graduate School Division of Comparative Culture)	Saburo Hanatachi (Part-time Instructor-<Former Prof.> /Kumamoto Univ. /Faculty of General Education)
		Saburō Matsumoto (Prof. / Keio Univ./ Faculty of Law)	Masao Okonogi (Prof. / Keio Univ./Faculty of Law)	Kunie Kawamoto (Prof. / Keio Univ./Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies)	Shigeru Usami (Prof. / Tokyo Univ. of Foreign Studies/Faculty of Foreign Studies)	Masanori Alkyō (Assistant Prof. / Okayama Univ./College of General Education)	Fumio Gotō (Instructor/Osaka Univ. of Foreign Studies/ Faculty of Foreign Language Studies)	Masayuki Suzuki (Instructor/ Seigakuin Univ. /Faculty of Political Science and Economics)	
C	History and Society of "Confucian Cultural Area"	Nobuyuki Kaji (Prof. / Osaka Univ./Faculty of Letters)	Seiji Imahori (Emeritus Prof. /Hiroshima Univ.)	Fumio Kobayashi (Prof. / Hiroshima Univ. /Faculty of Integrated Arts and Science)	Hiroshi Abe (National Institute for Education Research/Research Department 5)	Teichi Kawada (Prof./Kansai Univ./Faculty of Letters)	Fumimasa Fukui (Prof. / Waseda Univ./ School of Literature)	Hir shi Furuta (Assistant Prof. / Shimonoseki City College/ Faculty of Economics)	
D	Economics and Society of "Confucian Cultural Area"	Tsuneo Iida (Prof./International Research Center for Japanese Studies)	Haruo Nagamine (Prof. / Nagoya Univ. / Faculty of Economics)	Yōn suke Hara (Prof./ the Univ. of Tokyo/ Institute of Oriental Culture)	Isao Ōhashi (Assistant Prof. / Nagoya Univ./ Faculty of Economics)	Hiroshi Miyajima (Assistant Prof./ The Univ. Tokyo/ Institute of Oriental Culture)	Yūkō Arayama (Assistant Prof. / Nagoya Univ./ Faculty of Economics)		
E	Comparative Studies on Asia NICs I: Republic of Korea · Taiwan	Toshio Watanabe (Prof. / Tokyo Institute of Technology/ Faculty of Engineering)	Tatsuo Yamada (Prof. /Keio Univ./ Faculty of Law)	Takashi Kawakita (Assistant Prof. / Tokyo Univ. of Foreign Studies/ Faculty of Foreign Studies)	Yoshio Nakagawa (Assistant Prof. / Kyoto Univ. of Foreign Studies/ Faculty of Foreign Studies)	Sumio Kuribayashi (Assistant Prof./ Tokyo International Univ./ Faculty of Business and Commerce)	Nobuyuki Kasai (Assistant Prof. / Yachiyo International Univ. / Faculty of Economics)	Hirokazu Kajiwara (Assistant Prof. / Chiba Keizai Univ. / Faculty of Economics)	
F	Comparative Studies on Asia NICs II: Hong-Kong · Singapore	Kazuma Egashira (Prof. / Nippon Univ. / Faculty of Commerce)	Yasumitsu Nihei (Prof. / Keio Univ./ Keio Economic Observatory)	Ryokichi Hirono (Prof. / Seikei Univ. / Faculty of Economics)	Kunio Yoshihara (Assistant Prof. / Kyoto Univ. / Center for Southeast Asian Studies)	Kyoko Tanaka (Prof. / Chūbu Univ. / Faculty of International Relations)	Makoto Ōtsu (Prof. / Nanzan Univ. / Faculty of Business Administration)		
G	Society of the Overseas Chinese and Development of East Asia	Masami Imatomi (Prof. / Toyo Univ. / Faculty of Literature)	Tetsuya Yamamoto (Prof. / Kitakyushu Univ./ Faculty of Foreign Studies)	Kiyomi Yamashita (Assistant Prof. / Akita Univ./ Faculty of Education)	Shigeo Arai (Assistant Prof. / Mie Univ. / Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences)	Hirofumi Ogi (Assistant Prof. /Ritsumeikan Univ./Faculty of International Relations)	Isamu Ōta (Prof. / Toyo Univ. / Faculty of Literature)		
H	Comparative Studies of International Environment on ASEAN countries and East Asia	Tatsumi Okabe (Prof./ Tokyo Metropolitan Univ. / Faculty of Law)	Tadashi Nishihara (Prof. / National Defense Academy / Department of Social Science)	Kazuko Mori (Prof. / Univ. of Shizuoka / Faculty of International Relations)	Yoko Yoshikawa (Prof. / Kyoto Sangyō Univ. / Faculty of Foreign Studies)	Susumu Yamakage (Assistant Prof. / the Univ. of Tokyo / College of Arts and Science)	Yasuko Kono (Assistant /Tokyo Metropolitan Univ. / Faculty of Law)		
I	Theoretical Model of Development on East Asia : Economics and Society	Yasukichi Yasuba (Prof. / Osaka Univ. / Faculty of Economics)	Yutaka Kosai (Director of Japan Economic Research Center)	Takashi Konami (Prof. / Tokyo Univ. of Foreign Studies / Faculty of Foreign Studies)	Ryōshin Minami (Prof. / Hitotsubashi Univ. / Institute to Economic Research)	Kuniko Inoguchi (Prof. / Sophia Univ./ Faculty of Law)	Jun Onozawa (Assistant Prof. / Tokyo Univ. of Foreign Studies / Faculty of Foreign Studies)		
J	Theoretical Model of Development on East Asia : Politics and International Relations	Takashi Inoguchi (Prof. / the Univ. of Tokyo / Institute of Oriental Culture)	Masaya Shiraiishi (Assistant Prof. /Yokohama City Univ./Faculty of Liberal Arts and Science)	Hajime Izumi (Assistant Prof. / Univ. of Shizuoka/Faculty of International Relations)	Masatake Wakabayashi (Assistant Prof. / the Univ. of Tokyo / College of Arts and Science)	Akihiko Tanaka (Assistant Prof. / the Univ. of Tokyo / College of Arts and Science)	Satoshi Amako (Assistant Prof. / Univ. of the Ryukyus / Junior College)	Seichiro Takagi (Prof. / Saitama Univ. / Graduate School of Policy Science)	

[Section of Voluntary Research]

- ★ Entrepreneurship and Modernization on Confucian Cultural Area — Comparative Studies on Zhang-Jian and Eichi Shibusawa:

Hidemoto Nakai (Hokkaido Univ./ Faculty of Letters)

- ★ General Survey of the PRC's Policy on the Overseas Chinese and their Education:

Shunichi Nishimura <Head> (Tokyo Gakugei Univ./ Center for Education of Children Overseas);

Keiji Ishikawa (Yamanashi Univ./ Faculty of Education); Sadahiko Mizoguchi (Seitoku Junior College of Nutrition); Masahiro Sera (Meiji Gakuin Univ./ Faculty of Literature); Zhong Qing-han (Bunka Women's Univ.); Duan Bai-lin (Asia Culture Research Institute); Otohiko Mikasa (Tokyo Gakugei Univ./ Faculty of Education); Hōichi Tsuchimochi (Tōyō Eiwa Junior College); Setsuo Nishino (The Univ. of Tokyo/ Faculty of Education); Hideo Kakinuma (Tokyo Metropolitan Univ./ Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities), Takuzo Minagawa (Kanagawa Prefectural College of Nursing and

Technology); Heizo Kobayashi (Kagoshima Univ./ Faculty of Education); Atsuko Shinbo (Kyoto Univ. /Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Documentation Center for Oriental Studies)

- ★ Comparative Studies of Social Change in ASEAN and Asia NICs — urban and rural area — :

Jun Kitahara <Head> (Kobe Univ./Faculty of Letters) Toshio Tasaka (Osaka Univ. of Economics and Law /Faculty of Economics); Hideki Takizawa (Konan Univ./Faculty of Economics)

- ★ The image of the Meiji-Era's leaders in the historiography of Modern China

Tadashi Nakamura (Tokyo Gakugei Univ./ Faculty of Education)

- ★ Chinese Statistical Survey System and the Accuracy of Data

Yoshiro Matsuda <Head> (Hitotsubashi Univ./ Institute of Economic Research); Toshiyuki Mizoguchi (Hitotsubashi Univ./Institute of Economic Research); Takeshi Hamashita (the Univ. of Tokyo/ Institute of Oriental Culture); Toshio Tajima (the Univ. of Tokyo/Institute of Social Science)

- ★ Comparative Studies on Oriental Modernization of ASEAN countries and East Asian countries

Yukio Kaneko <Head> (Hiroshima Univ. of Economics/ Faculty of Economics); Shoichi Yamashita (Hiroshima Univ./ Faculty of Economics); Sachi Kataoka (Hiroshima Univ. of Economics/ Faculty of Economics); Hiroshi Atsumo (Hiroshima Univ. of Economics/ Faculty of Economics); Koichi Nidaira (Hiroshima Univ. of Economics/ Faculty of Economics); Tao I-min (Hiroshima Univ. of Economics/ Faculty of Economics)

- ★ Economics and Culture of "Confucian Cultural Area"

Yasunari Maruyama <Head> (Kyushu Univ./ Faculty of Literature); Saburo Machida (Kyushu Univ./ Faculty of Literature); Kenryo Kawakatsu (Kyushu Univ./ Faculty of Literature); Nobuo Sakai (Kyushu Univ./ Faculty of Literature); Hideki Nozawa (Kyushu Univ./ Faculty of Literature); Manabu Arima (Kyushu Univ./ Faculty of Literature).

- ★ A Study on Confucianism and Groupism as the Cultural Background of Economic Development in Southeast Asia.

Hiroshi Hazawa (Waseda Univ./School of Literature)

- ★ A Study on the Relations between Political Change and the Change of Social-Economic Structure in Korea

Shigenori Moriyama (Niigata Univ. / College of General Education)

- ★ The Succession and Change of Traditional Systems through East Asian Modernization — A Comparative Study of East Asian Cities and Towns Focused on the Market Towns of China's Yangtze Delta Region

Sachiko Usui (Daitō Bunka Univ./ Faculty of International Relations)

Outline of the Joint Research

"Comparative Studies on the Economic and Social Development and Modernization in East Asia"

Economic and social development in East Asian countries or the West Pacific Region is being watched with keen interest in the international community of today. It is no exaggeration to say that the global center has been moving to the East Asian Area. It is a matter of great importance that whether NICs' remarkable growth shall persist or not in this situation.

Meanwhile, People's Republic of China has presented the new national goal called "Four Modernizations" denouncing Mao Ze-dong's model. Its evolution is very meaningful. Also of great importance is the future modernization of North Korea and Vietnam—China's surrounding socialist countries.

At any rate, economic and social development in East Asia indicates that the former modernization theories and socialism theory would be overtaken by reality. On the other hand, it proposes a subject for investigation if we can detect the possibilities of modernization and industrialization in the framework of the "Confucian Cultural Area." It is indispensable for academic and policy scientific aims to work out comparative studies in East Asia and investigate the theoretical model by wide-ranging scientific group research. Our research will be performed as a joint interdisciplinary project to clear up these problems.

Fiscal 1989 Budgetary Allocation for "Planned Research" and "Voluntary Research"

"Planned Research"	
Coordinating Team	¥19,000,000
Each Study Group	¥ 6,000,000 × 9 + 8,200,000 = 62,200,000
Subtotal	¥81,200,000
"Voluntary Research"	
10 groups	¥17,300,000
Total	¥98,500,000

Approaches to "East Asia and Confucianism"

Ryoen Minamoto

Professor, International Christian University

Our research theme for this phase of the project has been "A Comparative Study of the Henpo Reform Movements (to absorb Western institutions into a Confucian framework) in Japan and China during the 19th Century—Focusing on 'Yokoi Shonan and the Kumamoto Practical Learning School' and 'K'ang Yu-wei'." Its purpose is to facilitate historical research from different perspectives concerning actual historical movements within the tradition of Confucianism that took place in the Confucian cultural zone of East Asia.

Both Yokoi (1809–1869) and K'ang (1858–1927) accepted Confucian precepts as being universally true and based their respective responses to Western culture on this belief. These two political philosophers agreed with those who sought to emulate the West that the superiority of the Westerners was to be found not only in their military and scientific technologies but also in their political institutions. However, Yokoi and K'ang also argued that the essential elements of these superior political principles had already existed in the original, pristine Confucianism and that therefore what was needed was a reevaluation of Confucianism based on this realization, a process that would incorporate elements of modern Western culture.

One thing that should be pointed out in regards to both Yokoi and K'ang is that they neither one of them accepted the orthodox Confucianism of their day without qualification. Rather both of them believed in an idealistic form of Confucianism and a golden age. Shonan found his inspiration in the Shuching or *Classic of Documents*, said to date back to the Chou Dynasty, and the mythical age of the "sage rulers." K'ang emphasized the *Lichi* (or *Book of Rites*) and the *Liyunpien*, as well as the age of Tatung (Great Commonwealth) he predicted for the future.

I believe that if we want to emphasize the contemporary significance of the Confucian cultural zone of East Asia, then we have to adopt one of three approaches.

(1) We can study how various aspects of the Con-

fucian ethos—such as loyalty, sincerity, honesty and hard work—survive today in the countries of East Asia and attempt to make clear their current significance.

(2) We can accept an idealistic Confucianism, such as was expounded by Yokoi and K'ang, and attempt to judge how Confucianism might be reconstructed in our contemporary world.

Or (3), we can presume that the attempts by Yokoi and K'ang to universalize Confucian principles represent products of a specific set of historical circumstances and, although recognizing that Confucianism is already dead as an ideology, consciously accept the fine points of Confucianism that so impressed these two thinkers, while also realizing that if we are to apply Confucianism today, it must be from a totally different angle and as part of an attempt to create a new system of thought.

All three of these approaches demand a reevaluation of "tradition." However, the ways that this tradition is interpreted and adopted will be subtly different with each approach. For example, approach (1) deals with Confucianism from the standpoint of its actual application in everyday life today, while (2) and (3) see it in terms of a set of ideas.

With the first approach, there can be no doubt about the actual existence of what we are studying. However, we must recognize that although in some cases unadulterated Confucianism may be responsible for given facets of the social ethos in question, more often than not besides Confucianism the influence of Buddhism, Taoism, Shinto, or in some cases Christianity, will also be readily evident in the makeup of the ethos.

Consequently, it would be dangerous to try to analyze everything solely in terms of Confucianism. We should observe the utmost caution when pursuing research, bearing in mind the historical contexts shaping the various societies and cultures in question.

There is a definite, albeit subtle, difference between the second and third approaches. Although approach (2) assumes that Confucianism is still a living ideology, approach (3) looks upon it as something that

ceased to exist at some point in the past. Furthermore, the area covered by these two approaches is also subtly different.

For example, approach (2) admits no doubts about the continued existence of Confucianism and its validity, and seeks to regenerate it as a social system. Proponents of this approach agree with the advocates of "enlightenment" through the adoption of Western civilization—for example members of the Meirokusha in early Meiji Japan and participants in the May 4 Movement in China—in their criticism of the traditional Confucian order.

A good example is the position adopted by Kenji Shimada in his paper "Confucianism as a Living Force" that was delivered to the 1988 Conference of East Asian Intellectuals, in which he emphasized the significance of Confucianism in today's world in terms of "popular Confucianism" in place of "mandarin Confucianism."

Shimada's views are buttressed by the fact that they are based on academic convictions arrived at from his in-depth study of the philosophy of Wang Yangming and later members of the Wang Yangming School.

The third approach has two distinct sides to it. First (a), it views many aspects of Confucianism in a favorable light and seeks to reinvigorate its finer points

through contact with different thought systems. And second (b), it posits that since contemporary life bears no connection at all to traditional Confucianism, experiments similar to the administration and public relief carried out in Confucian fashion in the past will now have to be attempted primarily from the standpoint of Western learning and thought.

If I had to classify my own position, I would probably say it is closest to point (a) of the third approach. I am largely in agreement with Dr. Shimada's views concerning Confucianism. And I was very surprised by the results of this historical research on Yokoi Shonan that showed how similar in many ways were the beliefs that Shonan professed in comparison with the opinions expressed by Shimada.

I should also note that the reason I identified myself with position (a) of approach three is that there seem to be certain areas that cannot be encompassed within the realm of Confucian thought. And I have the suspicion that in order to consider these questions properly, it might be necessary to step outside of the framework of historical research on thought systems and consider them from the vantage point of pure philosophy. In fact, I have a premonition that that might well be the form that my future research assumes.

Confucianism and Capitalism

Yukio Cho

**Professor Emeritus, Former President
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies**

In truth there is no agreed upon concrete concept of what the so-called "Confucian cultural zone" really consists of. Confucianism has in several countries served as the basis for education in the broad sense, and Confucian thought has been so assimilated into the manners and customs of various peoples that it has come to exert a profound effect on their value systems and manner of behavior. Consequently, a vast range of different patterns in different places would have to be considered in any all-encompassing theoretical concept we might fashion. For that reason, it is impossible to simply judge the various phenomena in these different areas—especially the economic development and related phenomena that we are primarily concerned with—solely from the standpoint of Confucian cultural influences.

Rather we should note how after the emergence of modern capitalism in Western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries the various distinctive societies within the "Confucian cultural zone" each in turn encountered modern Western civilization and reacted to its overwhelming, subjugating (or, if you prefer, universalizing) influences. We should also attempt to question how these responses differed in form and process from similar responses in other cultural zones (for example the Hindu and Islamic worlds).

It goes without saying that during the latter part of the 19th century Japan adopted the modern capitalist system and that some of the other Asian countries that were colonized or forced into semi-colonial status at that time have managed after attaining independence in the wake of World War II to achieve remarkable

economic growth. (These are the so-called NIES.) Consequently, it is essential that we take into account the differences encountered at the various historical stages of the formation, development and dissemination of modern capitalism.

Bear in mind, when considering the relationship between Confucianism and capitalism, we are looking not at the outdated mercenary capitalism that was concerned solely with profits, but rather a modern form of capitalism that produces modern technologies and consciously incorporates them into production processes. It is an economic system that also provides financial resources and services to a freely competitive market that naturally seeks a price equilibrium between supply and demand, and promotes constant economic renovation and rationalization.

Of course, it was Max Weber who identified the transcendent tenets of Calvinism as the internal motivating force responsible for the evolution of an ethos that prized a willingness to forego immediate reward—an ethos that more than anything else was responsible for the final emergence of modern capitalism. However, he considered the tendency of Confucianism to be linked to the tradition of seeking—through the application of ethics—a lasting temporal order as constituting a hindrance to the establishment of modern capitalism.

In the 19th and 20th centuries modern capitalism has caused the disintegration or decay of older economic systems and achieved overwhelming superiority as the preferred system. At the same time, its own structure has evolved, so that early on its ethical energy dissipated and its underlying ethics lost their original moral complexion to gradually become transformed into systemitized regulations, such as rules of employment. So eventually what is left is pretty much a carbon copy of traditional authority.

If modern capitalism is accepted under such conditions, Confucianism would seem to be suited for combination with modern capitalism. In other words, the

very characteristics of Confucianism that have in the past been looked upon as a hindrance may take on a different hue if through a proper coordination between business and government they can bring about the development of businesses that have a rational labor structure.

Nevertheless, such a metamorphosis is not possible if old-fashioned Confucianism is simply adopted as is. Confucianism itself must first undergo a transformation because of the impact of Western civilization. Many of the ideas set forth by Shibusawa Eiichi (1840–1913), such as “study of both the Analects and the soroban,” “mutual obligations” and “union of economics and morality” are good examples of such a synthesis. In his works, including *The Experimental Analects* or *Seien Hyakuwa*, we can see the revolutionary directions his thought was taking.

Some of the reasons why Shibusawa could reinterpret Confucianism in these ways were due to the social strata from which he emerged, as an independent farmer during the closing days of the Tokugawa Bakufu, and commercial producer and distributor of indigo balls used for dyeing. He was what we might call a “proto-industrial” entrepreneur and peddler by status. Be that as it may, Shibusawa was in no way inferior to the samurai when it came to his education in ethics, and he meditated deeply on lessons he had learned.

Two other self-reliant merchant/farmers who had a major influence at that time were Ishida Baigan and Ninomiya Sontoku. Both based their thinking on the Confucian classics, but also added concepts derived from Buddhism, folk religion and other popular beliefs to form their own distinctive philosophies that prepared popular thinking for the advent of modern economics.

So we can see how in response to such developments, traditional social relations and culture competed and interacted with their modern counterparts to give birth to Asian patterns of “modernization.”

Third General Assembly of the “Comparative Studies on East Asia”

Held at Oiso

– 1989. 9. 15. ~ 17 –

The third general assembly of the “Comparative Studies on Economic and Social Development and Modernization in East Asia” (or “Comparative Studies on East Asia” for short) Project was held at the Oiso Prince Hotel from September 15 to September 17,

1989. As this was the final year of the three-year joint study, top foreign scholars were invited to address the meeting and they took part in a lively exchange of views with the participants.

Addressing the assembly were Prof. Leon

Vandermeersch (Paris University), Prof. Ronald P. Dore (Science and Technology Institute, Imperial College, London University; the Institute for Research on Japan and International Comparative Research on Industrial Problems), Prof. Theodore de Bary (Columbia University) and Lee Khoo Choy (General Manager of UIC China-America Corporation and former Singapore ambassador to Japan).

Other special guests who acted as discussants were Prof. Nguyen Chon-tau (History Institute, Vietnam Social Sciences Commission) and Mr. Kang Song-ku (President, South Korea's Culture Broadcast Network; Guest Researcher at Tokyo University's East Asia Cultural Research Institute).

Researchers from India, the United States, Taiwan and other countries also participated.

Altogether, counting observers, around 150 individuals participated in the assembly, the largest number for any of the three assemblies. Special guest Hiroshi Kida (Former Vice Minister of Education; President, Dokkyo University) addressed the meeting. Yoichi Itagaki (President, Hachiyō International University), Professor Junichi Kyogoku (President, Japan Women's University) and several other special guests also participated.

On the evening of the second day, a welcoming party was held at which the guests were introduced and the special speakers introduced their wives and families. The participants socialized amidst a relaxed atmosphere. It should be noted that at this assembly plenty of free time was scheduled and many participants took the opportunity to play tennis or go swimming after the sessions.

Below is the Program of the Third General Assembly and a summary of the reports presented and discussions held.

Session 1

China's Fifth Modernization

Leon Vandermeersch
(Professor, Paris University)

In Asia during the next century, not only the NIES, but China as well, will likely achieve remarkable development. But such irreversible development does not suggest total Westernization. In fact the safeguarding of a country's core cultural identity will be an essential prerequisite; this more than anything will be necessary to establish the conditions required for economic growth.

In this context, we cannot ignore the Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989. I would like to take a look at this movement for democratization from three perspectives.

First, there is its connection to China's economic difficulties. China has for some time now been plagued by inflation, unemployment, disparities of wealth, and several other problems. But all developing countries face similar difficulties. Although prices for the essentials for daily life rose in China by around 100% during 1988, these figures are not so serious when compared to certain countries in Latin America and Vietnam.

Still, according to a report in the February 26, 1989 edition of *The People's Daily*, around 50 million poor have flowed into China's cities. But when you consider China's population of one billion, Chinese cities still do not suffer from the problem of extreme concentration to the degree that certain other major urban centers, like Seoul and Mexico City, do. Be that as it may, the influx from the countryside has indeed led to an increase in crime, as reflected by the fact that in 1988 prosecutions were up 45.1% involving 82,700 individuals. But that is not to say that this was the major cause of the Tiananmen Incident.

On the other hand, Beijing's economic reforms have run into a stone wall. Grain production has stagnated and the policies to keep down population growth have not proved as effective as hoped. Still there is no real food shortage, and the calorie level is about the global average. In the industrial sector, however, there are substantial hurdles to reform and the imbalance in the nature of growth is widening. In addition, the economic controls instituted by the government have largely failed. Moreover, the deadlines for repayment by China of foreign debts has been pressing. Even so, prior to the Tiananmen Incident, international confidence in China was at a level just behind that of the advanced countries.

The truth is this latest crisis was not a crisis of the "four modernizations" policy. Rather it was a crisis of the so-called "fifth modernization" or democratization. This "fifth modernization" is a natural outgrowth of the "four modernizations" which are exclusively of a scientific and technological nature.

The second viewpoint sees the press for change as an "ideological" movement. Accordingly, the democracy movement has been led by intellectuals and has lacked concrete organization. All they have really been calling for is recognition of fundamental human rights. However, democracy, liberty and respect for human being are rights that in the West represent the fruits of revolution.

In post-Mao China, however, the drive for recognition of human rights represents a reaction to the last stage of revolution, in other words the Maoist Cultural Revolution. The April 5, 1976 demonstrations that took place in Tiananmen Square can be viewed as the beginning of this "reaction." As in that incident when the people used the occasion of the death of Zhou Enlai to show their feelings, the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989 was sparked by the death of Hu Yaobang. Both men became symbols of democratization.

For that reason, these large-scale demonstrations were peaceful in nature and did not aim to overthrow the Establishment. Rather their desire was to achieve reform from within. The leaders of the anti-status quo movement eventually realized that if they could not achieve what they wanted, and reluctantly they turned against the system, which led to their expulsion from the Chinese Communist Party.

The difference between the May 4 Movement of 1919 and this movement is that the former sought democratization through revolution; this time around democracy is seen as opposed to the Revolution. This also differentiates the democratization movement within Communist China from similar movements in Taiwan and South Korea. As a result of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese people have become extremely sensitive to "violence," much as the Japanese are fearful of rearmament because of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

Deng Xiaoping sought to suppress this movement in the name of the "four principles." However, viewing things from the standpoint of economics, these "principles" too are clearly incapable of checking the "hollowing out" of ideology. For example, when in 1986 the theory was advanced that "only highly centralized political power is capable of carrying out economic reform and paving the way for democratization," there was no reaction at all.

Nevertheless, from around July 1988 this was approved as official doctrine, and at a symposium held in December at Beijing University about reform in the next decade this policy was reemphasized in discus-

sions, which among other things, attributed the success of the NIES to their strong governments.

The theory that a strong government is essential for China has absolutely no connection to the traditional socialist theories of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or the "the People's Democratic Dictatorship." Rather it is designed to form a basis for stabilization of conditions for the free market economy in China that is now blossoming. But it is clear that in the process the government has abandoned orthodox socialism.

The third view examines the behavior of the Chinese government in these series of incidents. The participants in the latest Tiananmen demonstrations affirmed the socialist system. Consequently, the armed suppression carried out by the government on June 3 and June 4 was unreasonable and illegal. Even though Premier Li Peng claimed that "a handful of agitators duped many supporters of the party and the government," there was not the slightest justification for the suppression.

Still, not only has Li Peng been unwilling to convene a special session of the National People's Congress, he also postponed the regular session of the National People's Congress. This behavior can also be considered in violation of CCP rules. Also, at the time of the Tiananmen crackdown he took advantage of CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang's absence in Pyongyang to convene an expanded meeting of the Politburo that was dominated by hardliners.

In addition to these factors, we need to point out the immense power of Deng Xiaoping. His position has been compared to that of Mao Zedong in the past, but there are fundamental differences between the two. Mao directed the revolution to the end from a suprallegal position. But in China today the revolution totally lacks legitimacy.

This incident can also be interpreted as a form of coup d'etat, but if so it only points up the poor quality of the army and its rowdiness. Deng appears to have won a victory at great cost. But it seems clear that the revolution is past its prime and although Deng and his colleagues may desire to see it continue, there can be no doubt but that its days are numbered.

Discussant: Kunie Kawamoto
(Keio University)

Confucianism in Vietnam and Modernization
- As Related to Incidents in Contemporary
China -

Vietnam, the only Mahayana Buddhist country in Southeast Asia, was from the 11th Century to the beginning of the 20th century ruled by a Chinese-style

monarchy. It carried out its rule primarily on the basis of Confucian doctrines. The last dynasty in Vietnam, the Nguyen (1804–1945), was especially keen in this regard. The culture of the upper classes in the country increasingly became a culture of “Chinese characters.” Most symbolic of that was the civil service examination system imported from China. The Nguyen Dynasty employed it all the way up until 1919.

Even in the post-World War II education system, terms derived from this mandarin examination system, such as the Vietnamese equivalents of the *xiuca* (licenciate) and *juen* (metropolitan degree – meaning literally “recommended man”), were still employed. This tradition shows just how strong this social and cultural influence continues even to this day. I might note in this regard that we have on hand Prof. Nguyen Chuong Thau, who will be speaking today, and who seven years ago received the academic degree in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam that translates as “(vice) *jinshi* (presented scholar).”

Vietnam historically developed as a Confucian country, and even though since the beginning of this century Chinese characters have been gradually eliminated from the vernacular language and books and a socialist regime governs today, this example of the degree name shows how the influence of Confucian thought has still not disappeared from various facets of the nation’s cultural and social life.

It is also important to point out that the “progressive” Catholic intellectuals who adopted Western knowledge during the latter part of the 19th century were men who had originally made their mark in the world as Confucian scholars. And the core of the nationalist movement at the beginning of the 20th Century that called for the Vietnamese to learn from the “Enlightenment” of Meiji Japan was made up of famous intellectual leaders who were degree holders.

The Confucian tradition of scholarship never figured very prominently in the history of Japanese Confucianism. But the situation was very different in Vietnam, which has always been a primarily agricultural country. Future leaders of society began their education in Chinese characters at village schools and after they passed the official examinations they entered the governing class.

The ties between these degree holders and the villages remained strong and Confucian etiquette spread throughout society, with its influence filtering down in remarkable strength to the village level, where the vast majority of people lived. Nevertheless, the understanding of Confucianism remained far from clear for most people, and in many cases “Confucian” and “Chinese” meant the same thing to them. The term “Confucian scholar” also came to be applied to anyone who could read and write.

At the same time, the use of a jocular expression

meaning literally “one who can’t even tightly fasten the legs of a chicken” to refer to degree holders shows that although “Confucianism” was greatly respected by the common folk, they did not hold these “Confucian scholars” in great awe. At the same time, there is the very famous saying *The Emperor’s law does not supersede village commandments*, which shows how strong the tradition of self-rule was in Vietnam. That court law could not be enforced at the village level is an important facet of Vietnamese history.

Consequently, the fact that Confucian scholars, who were originally from ordinary villages, organized the democracy movement and called for modernization, when viewed alongside of the spirit of independence as well as the system of self-rule that has traditionally been present among the common people all reflect the a situation in which only on rare occasions did the country’s rulers impose their will directly on the villages.

In that sense, the use of tanks by the communist government to put down a demonstration in the villages of Nghe An in 1956 was a very exceptional incident. I think it is illustrative to recall that immediately after that incident the secretary-general of the Communist party was sacked and the nation’s leader, Ho Chi Minh, went on the radio to apologize in tears for the atrocity.

The Vietnamese have had a somewhat different impression of the Tiananmen Incident that occurred amidst many complications for China’s modernization policies. I think the Vietnamese are now tremendously concerned about how exactly they should proceed with the implementation of their own modernization policies.

Discussant: Nguyen Chuong Thau

(Professor at the Institute of Historical Studies, Committee for Social Sciences of the Socialist, Republic of Viet Nam: visiting professor at Keio University)

On the “Fifth Modernization” in China

Prof. Vandermeersch’s report and the report “China and Vietnam--A Shared Tradition and Contemporary History,” which deals with the current situation in Vietnam, give us Vietnamese much room for thought on a number of fronts.

I think that at present Vietnam is step by step laying the groundwork for “modernization.” *Doi Moi*, known in Japan as the reform line, in point of fact is a policy that should properly be referred to as “reform of thinking.” It calls for promotion of “respect for the rights of democracy and liberty” and is already achieving considerable results.

However, prior to this present stage, there have

been several instances in history since the start of the 20th Century in which far-reaching changes have come about through the search for modernization. After the anti-French resistance that supported the feudal monarchical system was eliminated at the end of the 19th Century, nationalistic movements arose that sought to cultivate talent, promote practical knowledge, aim for economic development, secure independence and catch up with the developed countries. The leaders of these various movements were members of the Confucian intelligentsia. One of their slogans was: "Open your eyes to the East, establish contact with the west."

They were greatly interested in the various political developments in late 19th Century China and the Meiji Restoration in Japan. But all of these movements in Vietnam were crushed by the colonial authorities. In fact, the colonial administration became even more oppressive in the wake of the First World War and the Vietnamese people turned to people's nationalism and socialism, and thanks to the revolution begun in August 1945 we were at long last able to establish a people's republic.

However, for the next 30 years we had to deal with invasions by two major nations and so the hopes for modernization we had entertained since the beginning of the 20th Century were once again dashed. In the meantime, Vietnam made historical progress as a member of the socialist community of nations in the world and for cultural and historical causes we as a matter of course maintained close ties with China, a fellow socialist country. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that historically by tradition China and Vietnam have usually been in a relationship of ruler and ruled.

Now at this historical junction in the latter half of the 20th Century, although China is a fellow member of the socialist camp, it has sought to continue this traditional relationship.

That is to say, in the latter part of the 1960s China frequently sought to force Vietnam into an inferior relationship. Then in the 1970s, the contradictions between our two peoples became more acute and finally in 1979 a two-year border war erupted between China and Vietnam.

At the same time, various countries of the world have been trying different ways to modernize. Vietnam, which had become estranged from China, did not choose to emulate the line of modernization that China began to pursue following the failure of the Cultural Revolution. Rather it opted for a new and totally distinctive model.

As Prof. Vandermeersch pointed out, even though Maoism is supposed to be finished in China, it retains its strength as before, as was recently demonstrated in the Tiananmen Incident. So it is not likely that Vietnam will anytime in the near future again succumb to

pressure and seek to improve bilateral relations of the former pattern. The reason is that since Vietnam has escaped from Maoist pressure, it is now free to pursue modernization in its own way.

Discussant: Fumimasa Fukui
(Waseda University)

Prof. Vandermeersch is a graduate of the Law Department at Paris University. In fact, it was only after he received his doctorate in law that he switched to China studies. Since then he has studied at the L'Ecole Francaise d'Extrême-Orient in Hanoi, Vietnam, in Japan (primarily in Kyoto) and for a long time studied in Hong Kong. His research has focused on the Legalists in China, legal thought and ancient Chinese culture. Among Prof. Vandermeersch's major works are: *The Making of the Legalists*, the two-volume *Kingcraft* (which received the Stanislas Julien Prize) and *A New World in the Chinese Image* (Translated into Japanese as *Ajia Bunkaken no Jidai*, Taishukan Shoten).

He has not limited his interests to ancient China, however. He has contributed many articles about contemporary China to *Esprit* and other general interest magazines. Prof. Vandermeersch is a member of the Japan China Academy, the Japan Taoism Academy. He is also a former president of the Maison Franco-Japonais, and a professor of an institute in the graduate division of Paris University dedicated to the study of religion.

I would like to make the following points concerning Prof. Vandermeersch's speech.

The professor was originally scheduled to speak on "The Age of the Asian Cultural Sphere," but suddenly switched the topic to "The Fifth Modernization in China." Then in his talk that fell naturally into three sections he discussed his impressions of this spring's Tiananmen incident and related problems. In the speech that he was to have given, I understand that he was to have opposed the notion generally accepted up till now that the use of Chinese characters has acted as an impediment to modernization in Asia. He planned to use Martinet's Theory of linguistic analysis to show that it is precisely because of the presence of Chinese characters that the cultural zone in which they are used has prospered, and to point out the positive sides of their use and other elements of Confucian culture.

In the talk that he actually gave on the Tiananmen Incident, in the first part he gave examples of the numerous economic difficulties that China is currently facing, such as the double currency system, and argued that when looking for the causes of the Tiananmen Incident, we should not underestimate the pernicious influence of the steady deterioration of the

economic order such as the double-currency system. In other words, he was arguing that the situation has resulted not from the danger of a termination of the "Four Modernizations Movement," but rather from the rapid growth of what Wei Jingsheng first called the "Fifth Modernization Movement."

In the second section of his talk, he pointed out that the democracy movement that has arisen since the death of Mao Zedong sprouted up in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, but that it differs from previous democracy movements in that it seeks to rid the revolution of its violent side.

In the third section, he noted that the armed suppression in Tiananmen Square ignored the fact that the protestors were acting legally, and that the way that martial law was proclaimed was totally illegal. He also concluded that although you can say that the government won in the end, if you consider the price that it had to pay, then it really might amount in the long run to pyrrhic victory, like the victory of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, over the Romans in 279 B.C. that was not worth its excessive cost.

Session 2

Economic and Social Development in East Asia and Confucian Culture

Ronald P. Dore

(Professor, Imperial College, London University)

When we consider the economic development of the countries of East Asia, we can identify several causal relationships. Of course, these are not solely attributable to the prevailing political system in a given country. As Adam Smith pointed out, economic growth requires certain political preconditions, including peace, competent government and the ability to collect taxes. Among the countries of East Asia that have been enjoying a high economic growth rate, there are a number of significant differences in regards to their domestic political systems. What causal relationships then exist among them?

A century ago many Western thinkers would have explained the causes in terms of race. But nowadays in looking back at historical experience, we must reject such a concept of race. In this talk, I would like to seek explanations in terms of cultural factors as exemplified by the expression "Confucian culture."

The use of the expression "Confucian culture" allows us to employ the comparative studies approach to compare and contrast "Confucian culture" with "Christian culture." As for the definition of the term, we mean Confucian culture in a broad sense—the cultural complex observable in those countries that have

had Confucian-oriented education, and that have established this tradition as an orthodoxy. I would like to consider four distinguishing factors common to Confucian cultures that I believe have contributed to economic development.

(1) A Strong Sense of Duty

The first characteristic of Confucian culture I would emphasize is the strong sense of duty—dutifulness that sometimes seems pathological. For example, when surveys ask what is the purpose of life, the number of people saying that it is to fulfill their duty is greater in Confucian societies than in the United States or European countries. Many of the respondents feel that they have many important duties, such as honoring promises, returning favors or supporting their parents.

Of course, these responses do not constitute positive proof, but various statistics seem to lend support to my hypothesis. Consequently, we can define the human relationships constituting a Confucian society in terms of loyalty and filial piety and a sense of duty on the part of subordinates. But the obligations of duty are not limited to these subordinates; superiors also are expected to fulfill their duty by conforming to Heaven's will. In this fashion, even statesmen are bound by a system of rules based on Confucianism.

In other words, in a Confucian society, the duties of individuals are given priority, while rights are subordinated. The situation is different in the West, it is true. But it would probably be unfair to automatically agree with the often made contention that in the West it is believed that ideologies based on the concept of rights are generally preferred to ideologies based on the concept of duty.

Well then, what kind of a linkage can we establish between this sense of duty and corporate spirit that encourages efficient economic activity? Max Weber found the wellspring of economic success in Protestantism, but he was discussing the period of the Industrial Revolution. In contemporary Asia, industrialization has already been achieved, and there is no need for the introduction of strong beliefs to shatter the status quo. For that reason, the prevailing labor ethic that envisages fulfillment of the self through fulfillment of one's duty gives priority not to personal profit but to profit for the group one is a member of.

(2) Acceptance of Hierarchies

Unlike in the West where history has witnessed the elimination of hierarchies, in the Confucian cultural zone consciousness of vertical relationships remains strong. Modernization theory holds that one of the conditions required for such modernization is the switch from authority by possession to authority by

achievement. And in Asia that shift has already been swiftly and completely effected. One result of the entrance examination system and similar practices in Japan is that a stress on competency has become thoroughly accepted.

In truth, this shift to a philosophy of achievement presupposes that the criteria for the formation of hierarchies will henceforth be based on abilities. But hierarchies themselves continue to exist as before. One of the most egalitarian of hierarchies for the distribution of status is based on years of service to an organization. This seniority system gives rise to conditions that facilitate the smooth operation of an organization. For example, vertical competition is kept within bounds, and because of "benevolence" seniors feel responsibility for the training of their juniors.

(3) Characteristics of Elites

One of the factors that has facilitated the smooth transition to a system of reward for achievements in addition to this seniority system is the existence of a meritocracy that is rooted in a system of selection by academic excellence and the ability to pass examination. This system has led to the creation of an intellectual elite that has very high status in society. It also has helped achieve the uniformity of talents that makes possible the smooth functioning of the seniority system. While in the West intellectual knowledge has been imparted at school, while ethics were taught in church, in the Confucian cultural zone both these functions were invested in the schools. In fact intellectual knowledge and morality were considered indivisible. In that sense when judging the student movement in China we must bear in the mind the sense of morality they have as the future elite of their country.

(4) Rationality

By "rationality" in this context I mean the following. It is a rationality that clearly identifies goals, and considers the steps required to attain those goals through identification of choices. Furthermore, based on these previous steps, it searches for ways to achieve the goals over the long term.

Such rationality can be discovered in bureaucratic rationalism. The merits offered by such rationality include the ability to forecast that is apparent in the bureaucratized societies of East Asia. The beneficial effects of this ability are especially important when it comes to efficiency in the economy. Another merit is that long-term planning is facilitated.

I think that we can also say that the long-term outlook of the Japanese when it comes to capital investment and their proclivity to save are tied to this tendency.

Discussant: Mr. Kang Son-ku

(President of the Cultural Broadcasting Corporation in South Korea; Foreign Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo)

Why is it that we can see such energy making for economic and social prosperity in the countries of the "Confucian cultural zone" and where is the wellspring for this development to be found? Speaking as a Korean, and therefore much influenced by Confucian thinking, I must say that I found Dr. Dore's remarks fascinating.

In speaking of the problem of self-awareness in the Confucian cultural zone, Prof. Dore identified several factors among the shared cultural factors that he believes have contributed to economic and social development. I find this approach very productive and insightful.

Prof. Dore elucidated four cultural factors in Confucian societies that he believes have contributed to economic development. These four cultural factors are: 1. a strong regard for the principles of duty and obligation, 2. consciousness of superior and subordinate relationships within organizations, 3. elitism, and 4. rationality.

I agree with the analysis pinpointing these four factors as important spurs to growth.

Finally Prof. Dore expressed his belief that technological development in capitalist countries might in the future tend to increase inequality because of the strength of the free market. He also surmised that Confucian societies may well prove better able to deal with this social danger of inequality than Western societies where individualism is stressed.

In other words such traditional Confucian values as family solidarity, a stress on academic study and a framework of ethical behavior may be what provide the leverage for development in East Asia. In the end they might even provide opportunities for modernization that will allow East Asia to surpass the individualistic societies of the West.

Often we tend to think of Confucianism as a form of antiquated educational system in contrast to developmental modernization that seems to demand a shift from the old to the new in response to the ever changing environment. In addition, an alleged lack of scientific thinking is frequently said to be the Achilles heel of the Confucian thought system.

But the truth is that not only does Confucian consciousness not deny the authority of science and technology; it positively promotes their acceptance and use along with their humanization. Furthermore, in today's

modern civilization, which is built on science and technology, if we desire to reaffirm the position of humanity, then the wisdom and religious thought of the countries of East Asia perhaps possess a new significance for us.

Discussant: Tsuneo Iida
(International Research Center for
Japanese Studies)

Prof. Dore cited aspects of Confucianism that he believes contribute to economic development. These include: 1. a strong sense of duty, 2. a hierarchical order, 3. elitist qualities, and 4. rationality. But I believe, especially if we are talking about Japanese thinking, that we can group factors 1, 2 and 3 under the general term "egalitarianism." One remarkable feature of postwar Japan (in fact it was around for quite sometime before) is the tradition that there not be too large a gap between the elite and the common people.

From the standpoint of the masses, that means that if too great a gap exists, they are likely to lose their desire to work hard. However, egalitarianism acts as a deterrent to such an ill. That is what Point 1 amounts to.

Basic egalitarianism also makes it easy to introduce the hierarchical order described in Point 2 since the masses accept it willingly. In this connection, I think the belief that the hierarchical order in Japan is more severe than in Europe or the United States is to a large extent a "myth." On the other hand, in Japan the elite view of this prevailing egalitarianism is what Point 3 refers to. The fact that the elite accepts the proposition that it should not abuse its special privileges is frequently emphasized.

Now a question that intrigues me is whether or not this "Japanese-style egalitarianism" is related to the Confucian tradition. Prof. Nobuyuki Kaji of Osaka University has referred to the expression "*Anyone who works hard enough at it can become a sage*" as an indication of egalitarianism inherent in Confucianism. However, one point that this theory fails to explain adequately is the undeniable fact that the egalitarianism so evident in Japan is not present to nearly the same degree in China or Korea, two other nations in the Confucian cultural zone.

However, there is a danger of taking the logic of this position too far. You could then emphasize the diversity within Asia and argue that in many ways mid-19th Century Britain and contemporary Japan are remarkably similar in many ways. For example, these two periods can be said to be the golden age of prosperity for the respective nations, during which time their inhabitants might with some cause be characterized as "economic animals."

Session 3

The Liberal Tradition in China – Confucian Freedom and "Confucian Democracy"

Wm. Theodore de Bary
(Professor, Columbia University)

This June, Deng Xiaoping cited the invasion of China by "bourgeois liberalism" as a justification for the suppression of the demonstrations then taking place in Tiananmen Square. Deng further argued that the concept of freedom of speech should be rejected as alien and harmful to China.

However, the truth is that the open discussion of political questions is part of the Confucian tradition. As far back as the 3rd Century B.C. a prime minister of the Ch'in Dynasty, Li Szu, labeled Confucianists as instigators of dissent among the people because they dared to offer opinions different from those of the ruler and openly criticize him. Li charged that such behavior constituted a direct challenge to the authority of the Emperor.

Such political oppression is today referred to as "feudal absolutism." In addition, the men who opposed such absolutism might be termed "progressives" who exhibited a democratic spirit, and moreover the phenomenon they represent can be identified with primitive capitalism and the rise of the bourgeoisie. Chinese historians affirm that although it did not enjoy much success "bourgeois liberalism" has in fact existed in China for quite some time. Consequently, leaving aside the question of whether or not today's democracy movement deserves to be labeled as "bourgeois liberalism," it is obvious that it is not simply a case of spiritual pollution imported from the West.

Similarly, the May 4th Movement is frequently regarded as an example of political problems being debated publicly. In fact, it has sometimes been reported that the tradition of public demonstrations dates back to the May 4th Movement. But as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Liang Qichao) pointed out at that time, a well-known Confucian scholar of the late Ming and early Ch'ing periods by the name of Huang Tsung-hsi (Huang Zongxi) had already taken the position that open discussion of public policy among scholars was just as important as education in academies and other schools.

Although Huang recognized direct protest as valid, he said that it should only be relied on as a last resort and emphasized the importance of rigorous debate within schools. However, Huang criticized existing schools for not fulfilling three key functions: 1) providing basic education to the common people, 2) dis-

Discussing important public problems at the various educational levels, and 3) training the knowledgeable leaders required by society.

Furthermore, in his book *Ming I Taifang Lu*, Huang stressed the importance of universal education. Even though Huang basically sympathized with the thought of the Wang Yangming School, he accepted the proposal made by Chu Hsi in his early days for a school system that would extend to the grassroots level—indeed would be built up from the grassroots level. He also conducted research concerning Chu's *Tahsueh Changchuhsu (Introduction to The Great Learning)*.

Huang believed that the real purpose of education was to form the character of the individual and he lashed out at the belief that the schools should be considered as training institutes for scholars who would support whatever dynasty was in power. In Huang's eyes the ideal school would perform two important functions, namely: 1) provide education for everyone who sought it, and 2) express public opinion. On the other hand, he said that the ruler should: 1) support schools that would contribute to the general welfare, and 2) allow the schools to act as a vehicle for the expression by the people of their views to the government.

Huang wrote that in ancient times the schools had publicly debated issues of the day, and advised rulers on how to act, thereby playing a key role in the affairs of state. However, he added that from the time of the Ch'in Dynasty, the schools had been deprived of that important function and an unnatural gap had developed between them and the state. As a result, thinkers who were interested in real education had gradually begun to look to the local schools and during the Sung and Ming dynasties such establishments became the centers of Neo-Confucianism. However, such schools were repeatedly shut down by the government for being too independent and heterodox.

Huang thought that ideally a universal system of public education, while serving to support the government, should be independent from central control and that under it schools should be established at every level—from the capital, down to towns, villages and even the smallest hamlets. He also believed that the heads of these schools should not be appointed by the court, but instead should be chosen locally.

Furthermore, in addition to advocating complete independence for these schools concerning normal educational affairs, he also said that they should have the right to ignore the views of educational officials to a certain extent and that local governors should respect their views concerning problems affecting the entire community. As for the national university in the capital, Huang argued that its head should prepare monthly lectures to be delivered directly to the Emperor and his chief officials.

The idea that education should serve to generate spontaneous discussion of public affairs was inherent in Neo-Confucianist thought from the very beginning, but Huang developed it to a new plateau during the latter half of the 17th Century.

Then in the latter part of the Ch'ing Period there was the scholar Fang Tung-shu, who unlike Huang belonged to the Neo-Confucian mainstream of the orthodox Chu Hsi School. However, although most of his fellow adherents of Chu Hsi thought took a critical view of the idea of open debate, Fang's opinions concerning education, schools and open debate resembled those of Huang.

What is really amazing is that Fang identified these things as part of a tradition that he said dated back to the time of the ancient sages. In his book *Hantzu Shangtui*, Fang pointed out the importance of academic argument and open debate. Of course here the term "open" does not mean the same thing we do when we use it today.

He noted how during the Chou Period Chao Kung had protested against the despotic rule of King Li. Chao Kung explained to the king that his strategy of being satisfied with simply stifling any hint of criticism was exactly like a dam holding back the torrent of criticism. He added that to shut the mouths of everyone was more dangerous than seeking to block the course of a river. When the waters of such a river finally break free then many people suffer. The same principle was true in handling men, Chao Kung argued.

The right way to go about controlling a river is to leave open a channel to carry away the waters. The same idea holds true for controlling people, according to Chao Kung. To make his point that the encouragement of debate among the people and consultations with his subjects is the way for a successful ruler to govern, Fang cited many cases from the classics of rulers who failed precisely because they had not done so. He also emphasized that schools should play the role as the central forum for such debate.

It is true that Fang failed to offer the systematic conceptual framework that would be essential to support such open debate. But he did spotlight a tradition that had long existed in China to justify his contention that what was needed was vigorous open debate of public issues, especially in the schools. He added that it was the very lack of such a debate that had led to the disappearance of expressions of public opinion and the loss of their constructive influence.

Discussant: Nobuyuki Kaji
(Osaka University)

First of all, I should like to note that the "liberalism" that Dr. de Bary refers to corresponds to a defi-

inition of "liberalism" in Webster's New International Dictionary. This is a totally modern idea. Then too, Dr. de Bary argues that since in China the Chu Hsi School used expressions like "self-responsibility, self-satisfaction and self-study," which emphasized the role of the individual, that means that there was scope for self-determination of one's way of living within Chu Hsi thought. He also suggests that in pre-modern China free debate was carried on at the private academies. In other words, Professor de Bary is arguing that after the appearance of the Chu Hsi School a liberal tradition developed that allowed for self-determination and free debate.

I have two doubts in regard to this position.

First, the Chinese term *tzuyu* (*jiyu* in Japanese) that is used throughout the Confucian cultural sphere and is translated into English as "freedom" or "liberty" if looked at in the positive sense means having the leeway to cultivate oneself as one sees fit, or if looked at negatively refers to self-indulgence and selfish conduct. In his book *Tetsugaku Jii (A Dictionary of Philosophy)*, Tetsujiro Inoue—a man deeply influenced by Chu Hsi thought—writes that even though *tsuyu* is translated into English as "freedom" or "liberty" these are not necessarily appropriate equivalents.

Chu Hsi thought disdained the concept *tsuyu tzuli* or "self-interest." In fact, this expression was originally used to refer in a critical way to Buddhist priests, whom the Confucianists felt had selfishly abandoned their families to seek their own salvation.

As a matter of fact, Confucianism traditionally was critical of the idea of self-interest or *dzuli*. In Inoue's *Tetsugaku Jii*, for example, *tzuli chui* (*Japanese = jiri shugi*) is the term used to correspond to the English word "egoism." In opposing this idea of self-interest, the Confucianists sought to develop a personal character that would contribute to the family and the local community through the exercise of such virtues as *tzujen* (assumption of moral responsibility), *tzute* (development of personal morality) and self-cultivation. They certainly did not correspond to the modern concepts of freedom and liberty.

Secondly, it is true that during the Sung Dynasty private academies began to be founded at which instruction stressed the guidance of the individual student. However, their role was related to the question of training future officials. Previously in China recommendation had been the principal way of recruiting new officials, who had for the most part been selected from the national schools.

However, after the Sui and T'ang dynasties, the examination system became the preferred mode for deciding who was qualified to hold office. The emphasis was now on studying to pass the examinations and as a result the national academies lost their pre-eminence. The Sung Dynasty scholars who had been

adversely affected by the change took to opening their own private academies, where they could engage in the training of others. Nevertheless, the main emphasis of the instruction given in these private schools concerned how to pass the state examinations, they were simply not organized in such a way that they could serve as a vehicle for the expression of public opinion. In addition, by the Ch'ing period these private academies were receiving official support and supervision, and they had in effect become subsidiary national schools.

Discussant: Teiichi Kawada

(Kansai University)

I found Professor de Bary's book *Chu Hsi Thought and the Liberal Tradition* to be extremely stimulating. The reason was that it evaluated Chu Hsi thought in a manner far different from the standard view held by scholars up to now that holds it was nothing more than a feudal ideology that supported an absolutist state structure. Furthermore, it also described how a tradition that Professor de Bary characterizes as liberalism existed within the universe of Chu Hsi thought.

In his presentation Professor de Bary developed the thesis advanced in his book and he presented new evidence to suggest that elements of liberalism and democracy were present in premodern China. In particular, he focused on the efforts of two men: the early Ch'ing era scholar Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-95), who Liang Ch'i-ch'iao referred to as "China's Rousseau," and his mid-Ch'ing counterpart Fang Tung-shu (1772-1851).

I find Dr. de Bary's arguments in regard to Huang very persuasive. However, I have my doubts when it comes the case of Fang, a second-rate scholar who did not even qualify for office. Professor de Bary cited several passages from Fang's book *Hantzü Shantungui* to buttress his argument. But I should like to point out that the general tone of Fang's work is one of dissatisfaction with the system of historical study prevailing at that time. That is something quite different from the liberalism that Professor de Bary apparently detects. I am afraid that Dr. de Bary has simply read too much into Fang's writings.

Still, I think that it is interesting to speculate about whether or not the democratic elements to be found in the thinking of Huang Tsung-hsi were revived some two centuries after his death by Liang Ch'i-ch'iao and other Ch'ing reformers thereby contributing to the dynamism of the historical process.

Nevertheless, I must admit that I was deeply impressed by Dr. de Bary's earnest academic effort to suddenly draw attention to the previously insignificant Fang Tung-shu and to discover something fresh in his works.

**“Social and Economic Development and
the Self-Awareness of the Overseas Chinese”**

Lee Khoon Choy

**(Director, the UIC Sino-American Corporation;
former Singaporean ambassador to Japan)**

There are many Chinese living in Southeast Asia today, who are not the proverbial *huach'iao* or “overseas Chinese,” but are instead *huajen* or “people of Chinese ancestry.” For example, the Chinese of Singapore, who make up roughly 75% of that nation's 2.6 million population, are *huajen*—or individuals of Chinese ancestry who have become naturalized Singaporeans—and should not be labeled as *huach'iao*. Likewise, more than one million people of Chinese ancestry have been naturalized in Indonesia. In fact, the majority of Chinese living in Southeast Asia have been naturalized in their home country and are now *huajen*.

Incidentally, the Chinese first began emigrating to Southeast Asia back during the 13th century when the Mongols invaded China. This first wave of migration included members of the Sung imperial family and many other people. Also, records show that Chinese married into the ruling family in Malacca during the Ming Dynasty. This marked the beginning of a class of mixed ancestry—in other words the offspring of Chinese, whether from China or locally born, and mates of native stock.

Also, during the Ming period techniques of ship-building advanced dramatically, which partly explains the epic voyages of the eunuch Cheng Ho to Southeast Asia and parts farther west. The Chinese seafarers brought along with them Chinese women on these trips, who were offered as gifts to the local sultans. From these unions were born children of mixed ancestry.

That there was a good deal of migration from China to Southeast Asia during the Ming Period is demonstrated by the fact that in Manila in 1607 the Spanish massacred 25,000 Chinese. Another Chinese pogrom took place in Dutch Batavia in 1740 in which half that number were slaughtered. However, the Ch'ing government did not lift a finger to help its subjects who were so mistreated.

The slave trade from Africa was outlawed in 1814, but there remained worldwide demand for cheap labor. At that time unemployment was rife in China and famine was widespread, so it is not surprising that labor recruiters aware of this situation should head to that country in search of cheap workers. Then in 1860 Great Britain signed the Treaty of Peking with the

Ch'ing Empire. As a result markets for contract laborers, who were treated much like slaves, were established in Hong Kong, Macao and other points along the China coast and huge numbers of Chinese left the shores of their homeland.

Later, Sun Yatsen made several trips to Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, Japan and other areas to enlist support for the incipient Chinese revolution and to plot various insurrections. Discovering that the descendants of the Chinese immigrants living in these places had nearly lost their Chinese identity in its entirety, Sun worked for the establishment of Chinese schools in the countries of Southeast Asia. The Chinese who attended these schools all developed loyalty to their ancestral motherland.

The thought of Sun Yatsen also spread throughout Southeast Asia. As a result, when Japan invaded China intellectuals of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia felt that their own country had been invaded and became incensed at Japan. During the war years from 1937 to 1945, many of them returned to China to fight with the Chinese military forces. A good many of these found that they could not return home after the war and settled in Hong Kong.

In contemporary Indonesia roughly half of all local Chinese have been naturalized. In fact, nearly all want to become Indonesians, but the process of naturalization is extremely difficult. During the Sukarno era, the local Chinese formed organizations through which they sought to assimilate themselves to Indonesian society. However, during the bloody purge of 1965 nearly all the members of these groups were massacred.

The reason was that the native Indonesians harbored enormous resentment against the Chinese. The reasons dated back to the Dutch colonial period, when the Chinese merchants constituted an intermediary class between the ruling whites and the natives who were at the bottom of the social ladder. Also, even in modern times the Chinese tended to treat the Indonesians badly.

After the coup d'état of 1965, a second wave of nationalism swept over Southeast Asia and many *huajen* decided to return to China. However, they became caught up in the Cultural Revolution and many of them were sent to the countryside to engage in heavy labor. Nevertheless, financial support sent from their relatives back in Southeast Asia helped to tide them over this bleak period and maintain a relatively high standard of living.

This in turn bred resentment among their less fortunate Chinese neighbors. Eventually, *huajen* who wanted to return to their country of origin were able to do so, but many others moved to Hong Kong. One contributing factor to this phenomenon was the fact that some countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, refused to allow these would-be returnees

to come home. Now, however, these unfortunates again find themselves in a quandary as to what to do because of the scheduled reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997.

The country in which the Chinese have undoubtedly adapted the best is Thailand. Since nearly all Chinese and *huajen* are at least nominally Buddhists, there is no major impediment to their intermarriage with Thais and their complete assimilation into Thai society. Even among the highest levels of Thai society offspring of such mixed marriages are proud to proclaim their ancestry and no onus is attached to such mixing.

As for Singapore, at the time that independence was attained many observers predicted that the new nation would not be able to survive on its own. Despite such doomsday forecasting, the nation has survived and indeed prospered, in large part because its population is made up primarily of extremely hardworking *huajen*. Its leadership has also been outstanding and corruption almost unknown. Other factors contributing to its success have been strict regulations and the fact that a tight lid has been kept on inflation. As a result, Singapore has attracted trade and investment from around the world.

Even in Thailand at first Chinese capital was discriminated against and the government sought to run many business enterprises on its own. Nevertheless, its lack of business knowhow eventually forced it to come to rely on the *huajen*. These *huajen* in turn willingly cooperated with bureaucrats and a system evolved in which Thais would provide the equipment and facilities and *huajen* would contribute capital and knowhow.

The same sort of situation also developed in the Philippines, where the late President Ferdinand Marcos recognized the latent potential of the *huajen* community. He made use of their capital for his own purposes and in turn they availed themselves of his political power. The upshot was that in the presidential election between Marcos and Mrs. Corazon Aquino, the older generation of *huajen* tended to support Marcos, while their children backed Aquino.

Like in the other countries of Southeast Asia, the young *huajen* in the Philippines are in the grip of an identity crisis as they try to define exactly who they are.

Finally, I would like to touch on the question of why the one billion people of mainland China have failed so badly, while the Overseas Chinese have been so successful. A Chinese proverb states: "When they are in China, the Chinese are nothing more than worms, but when they leave China they turn into dragons."

In China the Chinese people are under the thumb of the Communist Party, so their sense of initiative is squelched and they cannot express their ideas. But if

they go abroad, they become free to do as they like. No matter how poor they may be, how much discrimination they may face from the majority population, there are still avenues of advance for them.

Secondly, we can point to the lack of a legal tradition in China. For 5,000 years the country has failed to develop the concept of rule by law not men. Traditionally, the word of the Emperor was the law. Consequently, there has been no mechanism for the expression of dissent and even today there is still a lack of understanding of the terms "personal rights" and "limits of authority."

In order for China to at last undertake dynamic change, the first thing it needs to do is abandon the dead weight of the present political system and introduce a free market economy.

Discussant: Masami Imatomi
(Toyo University)

In general the presentation was a look at the process Asia and a social history of their presence there. While looking back at some of the tragic incidents that checkered this history, Mr. Lee also spoke of current conditions. He also focused on some of the reasons for Singapore's impressive successes.

These include an appropriate sociopolitical system, superior leadership, a uncorrupt civil service and a diligent population. Mr. Lee also spoke of how the sense of identity among the Overseas Chinese paved the way for their present prosperity. This left a strong impression on us, I believe.

However, I think that there are several points touched on in the lecture that we would like to have more information about. For example, it would be interesting to know more about the intellectual difficulties and struggle in forming a viable self-consciousness that accompanied the three-stage evolution from Chinese to *huach'iao* to *huajen*. Also, obviously the Overseas Chinese and their local Chinese communities abroad will continue to evolve, but what are the prospects in this regard?

Such evolution is clearly taking place now, but have any steps been taken to overcome the contradictions that must surely emerge between the more progressive elements of the community and those that are slower to change. For example, there is the question of the social problems created by the increasing psychological distance developing between the English-speaking and Chinese-speaking members of these communities, especially the extreme Westernization of the former and possible contradictions that are developing concerning the proper value system for the Chinese community in the future. I would like to know more about such contradictions and the possibilities for resolving them.

For example, in regards to the language question, the policies of Singapore's prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, have tended to vacillate back and forth. Behind this flip-flop we can see the tendency to rely on "imports"—in everything from language and values to culture—to help resolve these problems.

Although the prime minister has declared that Asians should possess Asian cultural values, Westernization has probably already reached the point of being irreversible, so the breadth of policy options that will be available in the future has no doubt already been severely limited.

I would also like to know what Lee Kuan Yew is thinking about in regards to the future. In the question and answer period Dr. Lee said that for *huajen* society Confucian thought really just exists in a vacuum, since people do not have the time to make it truly part of their thinking. I think this existing situation must have both positive and negative aspects and I would have like to have seen more extensive discussion of this point.

Discussant: Kyoko Tanaka
(Chubu University)

The number of Chinese living outside China (*huach'iao* and *huajen*), including in Taiwan and Hong Kong, is said to be in the neighborhood of 28 to 30 million. Around 90% of these are to be found in Southeast Asia. They possess a great deal of economic power in that region, and in some countries control the commercial, industrial and service sectors.

Their tremendous economic power translates into massive remittances back to China and what is sometimes alleged to be an iron grip on the economies of Southeast Asia. In any event, the prevailing image is that they are outsiders who are in charge of the wealth of Southeast Asia.

But if you look at things from a different perspective, you can say that they are making invaluable contributions to the modernization and economic development of the region. The remarkable development of the ASEAN countries over the last 30 years has been centered in the urban areas where the economic activities of the *huach'iao* and *huajen* are concentrated, and it should be clear to anyone how important their contributions have been to overall progress.

They are living overseas essentially because they or their ancestors were willing to take risks to improve their lifestyles by moving abroad to work. Naturally, they tend to be enterprising types, who prize hard work and have a desire for upward social mobility. Not surprisingly, they also exhibit a keen thirst for education, and the second and later generations of these migrants have generally attained high levels of education, and have highly developed managerial and technical

skills.

Nearly all the *huach'iao* or *huajen* had prior to World War II already put down solid roots in the areas they had settled in and more than 90% have by now been naturalized. Also nearly all of them belong to the second or later generations. So they really do not deserve to be referred to as aliens anymore, especially since their self-identity has already been divorced from their ancestral homeland and they now consider themselves to be fully children of the country in which they live.

The most important factors in this change of identity have been education and language. Since outlets for Chinese-language education have been severely restricted, the younger generations of *huach'iao* and *huajen* have been educated in the local language, which they also tend to use in their daily lives. Furthermore, the educational content also serves to reinforce their feeling that they are citizens of the country in which they live. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that such a change of identity requires more than one generation—probably at least three or four for—the process to be completed.

On the other hand, the greatest obstacle to this change of identity is lingering nationalism amongst both the Chinese (*huach'iao*, *huajen*) and the indigenous peoples who are their neighbors. The former tend to remain deeply attached to the glorious legacy of Chinese civilization, while the latter actively discriminate against the "foreigners" in their midst.

In both cases, this sense of nationalism invites a reaction from the other side, which reinforces its deleterious effects, and invites efforts on the part of the native majority to force the *huach'iao/huajen* to assimilate and change their cultural values.

Despite various inhibiting factors, the "nativization" of the *huach'iao/huajen* is an inevitable process. The only question is at what pace it will proceed.

Summary Session

General Discussion

Panelist: Kazuma Egashira
(Nihon University)

There were high hopes that China's program of reform and opening up to the outside world would lead to increased economic, cultural and human interchange between that nation and the industrialized "Four Dragons" and Japan that would set all these countries on a course of mutual development in the future. However, these predictions had to be greatly revised in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown, one major effect of which has been the "elite drain" from Hong Kong that is casting a pall over its prospects for continued pros-

perity and is also affecting economic interchange with China itself.

The inflation that has afflicted China has caused great discontent among its populace, which in turn has provided the spark for a political debate. The result is that attempts to construct a new political system have failed and the path of oppression has been chosen.

The people have sought to survive inflation by acquiescing to the secret manipulations of bureaucratic brokers. However, it must be admitted that in many ways the wheeling and dealing of these bureaucratic brokers has served as a stimulus to the market economy of the country. This spirit of entrepreneurship on the part of officials can be traced to the tradition of the Chinese merchants and is in fact an inevitable resurfacing of that tradition; in that sense it is different from the manipulations of Soviet factotums.

The role that Chinese-owned enterprises have played in the industrialization and modernization of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore is also a reflection of this continuing tradition as evidenced by in-group patriarchal management and guild-like labor relations. Underlying all these are traditional beliefs, the core ideology of which is Confucianism.

I think that if the business dealings based on the connections and special powers of the bureaucratic brokers continue to develop as they have then they will result in a mode of operations much like those of these Chinese-owned companies. The preeminence of the concept of duty as explained by Dr. Dore and the social functions of etiquette outlined by Dr. Vandermeersch are intimately related to these Confucian religious concepts.

As I see it, the efforts to combine the *hujien* social system, which foster dynamic economic development—despite the traditional proclivities surviving in it—with socialism in order to try to shake China out of its economic miasma have been stifled less by problems regarding economic policy as such than by traditional political factors.

The resort to military force by the Communist authorities to suppress the Tiananmen disturbances was indicative of their devotion to absolutist, legalist ways of handling things. It is hard to escape the impression that a tide has swept the globe in which societies are sloughing off outdated orthodox socialism. And as the information revolution brings the world ever closer together, this tide is likely to engulf regimes in East Asia that seek to hang on to the old system till the end. When reform once again comes to the fore in China, we will perhaps see the emergence of something similar to the “Confucian liberalism” that Dr. de Bary spoke of.

Panelist: Yonosuke Hara
(University of Tokyo)

The view that the economic growth and development now being experienced in the East Asian region is connected to the special characteristics of the socio-economic environment in the region has spread widely.

Orthodox economic theory identifies the use of economic policies that emphasize free trade and market economics as the key factor that has fueled East Asia's economic growth. Nevertheless, the clear inadequacy of simple market economic theory to explain the highly dynamic process of economic growth in the region, means that something more than orthodox economic theory is required to account for the East Asian experience. So we must necessarily examine the social conditions prevailing in each of the countries in the region to make clear what special social characteristics enabled these economic policies to spark such spectacular economic growth.

Careful examination shows that when compared with other regions, especially the South Asian region, the East Asian zone has certain special features. First, there is no system that assigns an individual to a certain caste upon birth. As Dr. Iida pointed out in reply to a comment by Dr. Dore, it is probably fair to say that East Asian societies have had a system that at least theoretically offered “equality of opportunity.”

Secondly, as Dr. de Bary emphasized, the existence of a tradition of “liberalism” in East Asia has also been very important. Perhaps we can go so far as to advance the hypothesis that the traditions of “equality of opportunity” and “liberalism” that previously existed in East Asia finally flowered into a modern economic system characterized by free market competition.

This capitalistic competition has also spawned a new middle class in East Asian society. We should also bear in mind that in turn this middle class has served as a source of capital through savings and hiring, thereby helping to help sustain the region's vigorous economic development.

Panelist: Katsuji Nakagane
(Hitotsubashi University)

I would reiterate something I said at last year's conference that Dr. Dore disagreed with somewhat, namely my belief that when considering the development in East Asia we have to go beyond looking merely at the economic policies adopted by each country and also analyze the structures and systems in place in them. But even that is not enough if we want to fully understand what differentiates this particular region from others. Only cultural factors can explain the remaining differences.

On the other hand, perhaps the best example of how such differentiating cultural factors need not necessarily be negative, and indeed can be quite positive,

is Max Weber's theory of the effects of religion on society, most notably the "Protestant ethic." At the same time, we run into new difficulties if we attempt to attribute all cultural factors to the influence of religion. In other words, the role that religion has on economic development is by no means isolated and simple.

Next, there is the reality that results from the complex interplay of these various factors. Many suggestions have been made on how to grasp this reality, but the truth is that to date no one has been able to come up with a model that can systematically order the relationships among these various factors. For that reason, we can no doubt look forward to the emergence of some bold model that will tie all these factors together. But at the same time right now we need something that will allow us to demonstrate the relationships among these various factors and economic development, as well as the mutual symbiotic relationships among the factors themselves (actually there are points of resemblance and causality).

There are the mutual relationships among systems and culture. But what relationships of any exist for example between the free market system and a particular culture? And what are the differences apparent among various bureaucratic systems? The themes such as these that demand careful investigation are many.

Finally, at this year's conference Dr. de Bary delivered an important report based on his specialist research on the history of thought. I think that in looking at the Confucian cultural zone we need to go beyond analyzing the evidence in terms of social science, and adopt a much broader perspective of looking at it as an entire civilization. As Dr. Imahori wrote in the No. 3 issue of the Newsletter, in judging the prospects for regions to create new civilizations not created by Westernization, specialized social science research like mine based on corroborative evidence certainly has an important role to play. But I wonder whether the theme we are considering at these conferences does not really belong to the realm of intellectual history.

Summation Statement

Mineo Nakajima
(Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

We have been able to have very frank discussions over the last three days. Considering the difficult theme we were dealing with, it is perhaps too much to have expected any overall conclusions we can all agree to. But the process by which we mutually deepened our understanding through consideration of the related questions was in itself extremely important. The value

of joint research in the end boils down to the kind of results that the individual researcher finally comes up with.

Looking back at the themes we dealt with at the conference, first of all we recognized the necessity to reevaluate the process of modernization, to decide whether researchers have academic tools adequate to the task of explaining the simultaneous development occurring in the various countries of East Asia and to determine exactly how joint research should be conducted. We finally agreed that what we really need to attempt is not research into Confucianism as such, or the development of some theory of Confucian determinism, but rather an evaluation of the influence of Confucianism on the cultural history of social and economic development in the region.

Furthermore, it was agreed that three different currents can be identified regarding research in this field. First, the relationship between the social crises in Europe and the United States and the new prominence of East Asia has attracted a great deal of interest in Europe and the United States. The first scholars to identify the new economic zone developing within the Confucian cultural zone were Western scholars such as Roderick MacFarquhar, Chalmers Johnson, Leon Vandermeersch, Ronald Dore and Lucian W. Though we Asian scholars have begun to raise points of our own, the real issue is how we will react to questions from our Western counterparts.

Second, we are faced with economic stagnancy in the socialist world. The reevaluation of Confucian culture and traditions evolved to a certain extent from a need to explain the economic failures of Vietnam and China. And thirdly we have had the attempts to develop a grand theory, such as those of Marx or Weber, to explain the stupendous economic development in East Asia.

But once the research in this field began, it underwent various changes. For one thing, people wanted to know what had happened to China, in which such great hopes had been invested. Then there is the revitalization that has been taking place in Europe. This new vitality reflects to a certain extent a "Reaction to cultural absolutism," but at the same time it underscores the need to avoid any "cheap cultural relativism."

In this regard, I think we need to point out two problems. First we have the relationship between China and the NIES. Should we even consider China when we speak of the new prominence of East Asia? For some time I have tended to be skeptical on this point. And when we consider the economic stagnation and frustration that manifested itself in the Tiananmen demonstrations, as well as the high illiteracy rate in China, I think it fair to conclude that the differences between China and the NIES are

systematic.

The second problem has to do with the changes that have taken place in the authoritarian regimes in East Asia. This metamorphosis has been especially visible in Taiwan, and we need comparative research regarding this question. We badly need to focus on comparisons of bureaucratic systems, communities and other features of different countries. There is Weber's of course, but there are many problems that need to be looked at in this regard.

On the other hand, it is not easy to establish a direct connection between Confucianism and development. We can however look at the connection between economic development and the systems and organizations in the region, as well as the cultural back-

ground and customs—what Lucian Pye has referred to as “cultural dimensions”—that produced them.

In this way we can discover the differences in background between societies that have been influenced by Confucian culture and those that have not. Of course, when dealing with culture we must be very careful to consider evidence that both confirms or denies our suppositions. In addition, at the same time we must be sure to carefully reevaluate the traditional value system and take a close look at the relationships between that system and other value systems.

Numerous factors contribute to development. But as we agreed at last year's conference, once the economic take-off has begun, Confucian culture definitely provides a positive environment for its enhancement.

Academic Contribution by Dr. Seiji Imahori

The Social Formation of Feudal China written by Dr. Seiji Imahori was published by Keiso Shobo in February 1991. This 1,332 – page work is part of a trilogy, which consists of *The Social Organization of Feudal China*, *The Social Structure of Feudal China* and *The Social Formation of Feudal China*. This trilogy has been the main work of his career. Dr. Imahori wrote in the book's epilogue that he struggled to complete this book despite serious illness. We would like to introduce briefly here the table of contents of the book and Dr. Imahori's personal history.

☆ Dr. Seiji Imahori

- 1914 Born in Osaka
- 1939 B.A. in history, Hiroshima University of Humanities and Sciences
Overseas student sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 1945 Associate Professor, Hiroshima University of Humanities and Sciences
- 1950 Doctor Received PhD degree
- 1951 Professor, the College of Liberal Arts at Hiroshima University
- 1966 Overseas research scholar sponsored by the Ministry of Education

- 1969 Special Assistant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 1972 Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at Hiroshima University
- 1974 Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University
- 1975 Member of the Science Council of Japan
- 1977 President, Hiroshima Women's University
- 1980 Recipient of the Japan Academy Prize
- 1987 Resigned as President of Hiroshima Women's University due to illness

In the epilogue Dr. Imahori commented on the East Asia project as follows.

This work was undertaken as a part of the research report for the project called “Comparative Studies on East Asia,” (Scientific Research on Priority Areas, the Ministry of Education, 1986 ~ 1989) Unfortunately, I was hospitalized during most of the lifespan of this Research Project; therefore my research activity for it was necessarily severely limited.

I would like to apologize to Dr. Mineo Nakajima and all members of the project for my limited contributions. From the second year, in my place, Dr. Nobuyuki Kaji took over the responsibility for the research section of “History and Society of the ‘Confucian Cultural Area’.”

I would like to express my sincere thanks for Dr. Kaji's collaboration.

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Comparative Studies on East Asia,
Scientific Research on Priority Areas

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